This article investigates the Thatcher government's attempts to suppress or censor reporting on secret intelligence issues in the early 1980s. It examines official reactions to a BBC intrusion into the secret world, as the long-running Panorama documentary strand analysed the role and accountability of Britain's clandestine services. It also assesses the extent of collusion between the government and the BBC's senior management. The Panorama affair was an important waypoint on the journey towards the dramatic Spycatcher episode of the mid-1980s. The key players on the government side -Thatcher and Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong -failed to learn the lessons of the 1980-81 affair, that it was often more dangerous to attempt suppression than to simply let events run their course.
and the BBC's senior management. It also contributes to the ongoing evaluation of how the Thatcher government's approaches to press freedom, national security, and secrecy evolved. Furthermore, this article argues that the Panorama affair was an important waypoint on the journey towards the dramatic Spycatcher episode of the mid-1980s, when Thatcher's efforts to suppress embittered former MI5 officer Peter Wright's memoir resulted in huge public embarrassment. The key players on the government sideThatcher and Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong -had failed to learn the lessons of the 1980-1981 affair, that it was often more dangerous to attempt suppression than to simply let events run their course.
The contemporary and historical aspects of the relationship between governments, intelligence agencies, and the media have received increased scholarly attention in recent years. 4 In the BBC's case, historians demonstrate that the Cold War saw a complex and contested dynamic develop between broadcaster, government, and the intelligence services. From 1945 onwards, the corporation had the difficult job of balancing objectivity and journalistic impartiality with the dictates of anti-communism and deference to the secret state. 5 More often than not, the latter won out. The BBC's DG was often a key figure in this dynamic. Officially the corporation's chief executive and editor, by its nature the position necessitates frequent contact with officialdom on controversial issues. The record of successive DGs in resisting or acquiescing to official pressure on national security matters is complex. Post-war holders of the post had frequently held sensitive positions or been privy to official secrets. Sir Ian Jacob (DG, 1952 (DG, -1959 had been an assistant to Winston Churchill's war cabinet and a staunch supporter of the Foreign Office's clandestine anti-communist propaganda unit, the Information Research Department (IRD). 6 Jacob's successor, Hugh Carleton-Green (DG, 1960 (DG, -1969 , had been behind the British psychological warfare effort in Malaya in [1950] [1951] , and while DG, was party to the suppression of Peter Watkins's controversial pseudo-documentary The War Game in 1965. 7 Trethowan himself was a close friend of Edward Heath (Conservative Prime Minister, 1970 Minister, -1974 and was believed by some subordinates to be a little to close to the secret services. 8 In showing deference to official authority, Trethowan thus did little to break an established pattern.
The 1980-1981 Panorama affair has received little coverage in the literature, bracketed as it was by more prominent conflicts between the BBC and the Thatcher government, such as Tonight's interview with the Irish National Liberation Army on the assassination of Thatcher confidante Airey Neave, the 'Carrickmore affair' , and accusations of 'unpatriotic' coverage during the Falklands conflict. Historian Jean Seaton's controversial analysis of the BBC from 1974 to 1987 does not mention it, while journalists Richard Lyndley and Michael Leapman offer only a few brief paragraphs within their books onrespectively -Panorama and the BBC. 9 Ian Trethowan reflected on the affair in his 1984 memoir and in his reminiscences, former Panorama editor Roger Bolton comments on the imbroglio. 10 The affair emerged into a heightened atmosphere surrounding Britain's relationship with its secret intelligence and security services. Periodic 'intelligence flaps' had been part of the scene for decades and the post-war era saw concerns about intelligence capabilities, spies, subversion, and the relationship between the media and national security regularly rear their heads. The affair also emerged into a renewed Cold War, with the decline of détente and the resurgence of East-West hostility, where intelligence remained the Cold War's front line. 11 During the 1950s and 1960s, Daily Express journalist Chapman Pincher was a persistent thorn in the secret world's side, as well as a useful conduit for official leaking. Prime Minister Harold MacMillan asked, 'Can nothing be done to supress or get rid of Mr Chapman Pincher?' , while the historian E. P. Thompson pungently described the journalist as 'a kind of official urinal' . 12 By 1967, ministers were mired in the 'D Notice Affair' , the furore centring around Pincher's revelation that the intelligence services were intercepting private telegrams, and Harold Wilson's clumsy, counter-productive attempts to reinforce the secret state's crumbling walls. 13 The D-notice system -which persists today -was a voluntary system of regulation that brought together the press and the government. Reporting on matters related to nuclear weapons and intelligence activities were two areas where journalists were limited in what they could report. As the decades progressed, the system came under increasing pressure and began to fray around the edges. 14 Wilson's government also intervened to ensure the suppression of Peter Watkins' landmark 1965 nuclear conflict drama The War Game, for fear it would weaken public support for deterrence. This was a moment when -as with Panorama fifteen years later -the BBC approached the limits of what the government felt was appropriate for Cold War public consumption.
Parallel to Britain's economic woes in the 1970s, the edifice of the secret state suffered similar troubles. The activities of intelligence community apostate Phillip Agee and journalist Mark Hosenball (both Americans residing in the UK) in publicising details of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel raised the secret world's profile and resulted in their deportation. 15 In 1976, the young journalist Duncan Campbell exposed the existence, purpose, and location of the most secret of secret services: Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 16 By 1978, Campbell and his co-defendants Crispin Aubrey and John Berry found themselves in court for probing British signals intelligence. As Richard Aldrich argues, the 'ABC Trial' was a 'landmark event' that simply focused more attention on GCHQ's activities. The three were cleared of all but the most minor charges, as much to the Callaghan government's embarrassment it was revealed that the vast majority of their information came from publicly available sources. 17 This was only the beginning for Campbell, who by the 1980s had become the secret state's pre-eminent journalistic opponent.
Campbell loomed large in government thinking on the Panorama affair, his work influencing and complicating matters. Writing for the left-leaning New Statesman, in the first half of 1980 Campbell penned articles that delved into every aspect of modern Britain's relationship with its secret services, examining telephone tapping and communications interception, accountability, and press reporting on 'national security' issues. 18 Unlike the staunchly Conservative Pincher -who cultivated relationships with the rich, powerful, and well-connected through fine dining and weekend grouse-shoots -Campbell's genius lay in his ability to scour public sources, listen to the disaffected, and make connections where others saw none.
Changing attitudes towards secrecy were not only the province of journalists and apostates. In December 1979, Labour MP Robin Cook drew attention to the secret services through a bill in the House of Commons that -in the wake of Blunt's exposure by Thatcher -rather sarcastically suggested giving 'legal authority for the creation of a security service, and to provide for the appointment of its Director General and for his accountability to Parliament' . Of greatest concern to Cook were the legal status and parliamentary accountability of any such service. 19 The government's approach was to give the matter as little credence as possible, and Thatcher reluctantly assented to a 'do nothing' approach, letting the bill -which had little chance of progressing -fade away with minimal fuss.
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Thatcher herself had a confrontational and complex relationship with broadcasters in general, and the BBC in particular. She viewed the Corporation as anti-commercial and self-righteous, poisoning the national debate with its brand of wooly liberalism and moral permissiveness. Thatcher judged domestic reporting -especially on national security issues -within a Cold War paradigm, as a 'weapon in the global battle of ideas' . 21 She had little time for the notion that BBC journalists could be skeptics. For her, they were simply subversives at a time when Britain was fighting the Cold War and terrorism. 22 Thus, a culture of 'reflexive secrecy' surrounded those clandestine services that were playing such a critical role in the wars against the Soviet Union and Irish republicanism. 23 Thatcher's beliefs strongly influenced the Panorama affair. The Prime Minister loved intelligence and sympathized with the challenges faced by secret service personnel. 24 Her suspicion that any programme about the intelligence services would be partisan and damaging to the effectiveness and morale of the community came up against journalists with a belief in the right, and need, to know. Thatcher also believed in 'patriotic censorship' . Harking back to the World War 2 practices, the idea's influence in opposition to the media's increasing tendency to push the limits of dissent is plain to see. 25 For the Conservative leadership, 1939-1945 was the touchstone for great British struggles, defiance, and victory. 26 Likewise, the secret services importance in combating the imminent threat to Britain's security and integrity represented by the Northern Ireland situation was another complicating factor that militated against official openness on the workings and accountability of the security and intelligence agencies. 27 In this atmosphere, the Panorama team set out to explore the workings, actions, and accountability of Britain's secret services. The 'shock troops of truth' at Lime Grove were late to the party, but sought to deploy the BBC's weight and reputation to produce an authoritative, impartial programme drawing together the threads spun by Agee, Campbell, Cook, Hosenball, and Pincher. This was viewed with deep suspicion by a government that sought to bolster the secret state against its attackers, real and imagined.
In mid-June 1980, Panorama's editor Roger Bolton outlined to his superiors the reasons why his team were making a programme on the secret services. 28 Bolton said that journalist Tom Mangold and producer John Penycate would examine 'how the services can serve the country effectively while maintaining democratic accountability' by 'bringing together already published material and making it comprehensible' . 29 He argued that Blunt, Cook's bill, reviews of the D Notice system, Lord Diplock's ongoing inquiry into telephone tapping, and disclosures made by The New Statesman and Panorama's great rival ITV's World in Action, made the matter one of legitimate public interest. 30 Bolton had also witnessed the Church Committee's impact in the United States, which raised serious questions about intelligence agency accountability. 31 The programme, Bolton stated, was not 'motivated by any great scandal' and Mangold later recalled that 'politics did not enter my reasoning' . 32 By this early stage, however, the government was moving against the project. Rather than replying, the recipients of Gau's May missives had passed the letters to Whitehall. Thatcher was alerted to the issue during an early June meeting on the official histories of Britain's secret services (a project that she tried to quash). 33 In the interim, there had already been informal, 'high level' contact with the BBC about the production. At this point, Armstrong refrained from overt criticism, and suggested that in all likelihood, the programme would never be transmitted. 34 These 'informal contacts' were between Ian Trethowan and Bernard Sheldon, who for nearly two decades was MI5's legal adviser. 35 This was the first of a series of breaches of the BBC's supposed editorial independence. The DG was -initially -guardedly positive, remarking that accountability was a matter of legitimate public interest. Regardless, Trethowan raised issues that would prove to be a constant in the Panorama affair: that the secret services' work should remain secret; that the ongoing public comment about those services stemmed from 'the far left'; and that behind everything lurked the Machiavellian Duncan Campbell. Trethowan confessed to disliking Campbell, the journalist having recently written an 'absurd piece' about the BBC Monitoring Service's activities. 36 Notwithstanding Trethowan's concerns, the Panorama team assumed that the programme would be transmitted. Mangold contacted Nicholas Fenn, the FCO News Department's chief. Mangold described his letter as 'one for the Department of Long Shots' but reminded Fenn that he had usefully assisted a September 1979 Panorama episode on the USSR's Committee for State Security (KGB). The journalist then asked if he could obtain an interview with Soviet defector Captain Vladimir Rezun, and if the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, more commonly known as MI6) could give a non-attributable briefing? 37 When Fenn called Mangold, the BBC man accepted that meeting with Rezun would be impossible, but expressed incredulity that SIS would not wish to offer a briefing. According to Fenn, Mangold stated that he would not be dissuaded by an absence of official cooperation, a decision that might lead to serious distortions and give 'disproportionate space to partisan lobbies' . Fenn noted Mangold's intention to invite Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington for interview, with Fenn suggesting (reading between the lines of Mangold's comments) that any refusal would lead to Britain's most senior diplomat being publicly pilloried. 38 The decision not to permit the Rezun interview or an SIS briefing came from a much higher level than Fenn. Indeed, the FCO press officer argued that the choice was a mistake, and hoped it would be reviewed. 39 The higher level was represented by Sir Anthony Acland, Deputy Under-secretary at the FCO, and the chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). 40 Matters did not stop with Acland. Pressure was already being exerted on the BBC and the issue would shortly be debated at the highest levels of government.
Accountability sat at the heart of Bolton, Mangold and Penycate's desire to make the programme, and the official resistance to it. This resistance was going against the flow of events. In the United States, the Senate had just passed the brief but forceful Intelligence Oversight Act (IOA), which mandated that America's secret services make their covert activities accountable to Congress. 41 The CIA -in an attempt to repair their post-Church image -orchestrated a campaign of media openness during the Carter years. 42 The American revelations had worried Britain's intelligence community, provoking concern that they too would be subject to similar analysis. Despite the changes taking place in the US, there was no British equivalent to the IOA, Church Committee, or 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act. 43 Even on a less glamourous issue such as data protection, Thatcher's government resisted statutory oversight. 44 After the initial skirmish, Panorama became a subject of concern for the Conservative administration's upper echelons. The main figures on the government side were Thatcher and Armstrong, the latter a key link with the BBC and the architect of government policy on the matter. A more shadowy presence was Bernard Sheldon, the secret world's legal brain. Sheldon was undoubtedly the main instrument of censorship, but the nature of his 'recommendations' must be deduced from Trethowan's subsequent changes to the programme.
On July 21, Armstrong noted that he and Sheldon had once more met with Trethowan, whose gloomy view was that he did not think he could prevent a programme on accountability, even though he understood 'the dangers of lending respectability' to a campaign by Campbell, Cook, Robert Cryer, and others, all of whom were on the political left. 45 Thatcher emphatically objected to a programme on accountability, against Armstrong's suggestion that this was an issue of legitimate interest. Campbell and his writings were a thread running through government concerns about the programme. The journalist was seen as provoking the BBC's interest, although Armstrong was uncertain if Campbell bore any direct responsibility. Anxiety was expressed about the effects on the 'morale and effectiveness of the intelligence services' should media coverage go beyond minority interest publications like The New Statesman. 46 Here were two of the affair's critical features: the BBC's reformulation and publicisation of existing issues for a far wider audience than The New Statesman's readership and the perceived effect publicity would have the secret services ability to do their Cold War job.
An official veto was Armstrong's most dramatic proposed response. Through the BBC charter, the Home Secretary possessed the authority to restrict broadcasting on certain issues. A more innocent use of this was to limit political broadcasting during an election, but it had never been used to suppress a particular programme. Armstrong contended the veto's use would 'produce a tremendous hoo-ha, inside the BBC, in the Press and in Parliament, about censorship' . For the Government and the BBC alike, the veto had 'many of the qualities of a nuclear deterrent' . 47 Informed by her belief in the Cold War as an actual war, and reinforced by the conflict in Northern Ireland, Thatcher noted 'I would be prepared to use the veto' . 48 Thus, if the BBC were unwilling to self-censor for the good of the nation in a time of supposed national crisis, Thatcher would do it for them.
A basic plan was hammered out by Thatcher, Armstrong, Carrington, and Willie Whitelaw. Secret service chiefs had presciently informed Armstrong that using the veto would probably be a bad idea, the resulting row likely to do more damage than the programme. Reason, they suggested, must be used to persuade the BBC to drop the issue and desist from examining the service's workings. 49 A tripartite approach was agreed. Firstly, Armstrong would attempt to persuade Trethowan to drop the programme. Sir Brian Cubbon -Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office -would raise the issue informally with George Howard, the new Chairman of the BBC's Board of Governors. And it was decided that if both approaches failed, Thatcher, Armstrong, Carrington, and Whitelaw would meet to take a decision on the nuclear option. 50 A few days later, Armstrong met Trethowan again, once more connecting the BBC with the activities of secrecy's left-wing opponents, arguing that 'the activities of Duncan Campbell and those associated with him were doing the effectiveness of the intelligence services no good' , indirectly contending that the BBC's activities were unpatriotic within the context of a renewed Cold War. Yet, aware of The New Statesman's small circulation, he contended that Panorama's exploration of the accountability and workings of Britain's secret services would be far more dangerous. 51 Trethowan responded that the BBC would not make anything that was not 'authoritative and balanced' and that because of the services' unwillingness to cooperate, such a production would be near impossible. Armstrong noted that the Panorama team had been casting their net internationally, activities that the government found 'not merely disagreeable but in some cases positively discreditable' . Referring to an ongoing dispute over BBC funding, Armstrong found Trethowan's statement that cost would not prevent the production being dropped rather cavalier. 52 Concluding, Armstrong queried if the BBC wished to be associated with Cook, Campbell, and their campaign to 'discredit' the services and damage their effectiveness, something they may be exploiting the Corporation to do? Trethowan promised to consider this. 53 Reading the record of the conversation, Thatcher noted 'the matter has been put to the BBC in no uncertain terms' . 54 Trethowan's reflections did not endear him to Thatcher and illustrated the problematic nature of his position regarding attempts to influence the work done by a supposedly impartial, apolitical public broadcaster. On Trethowan's inability to stop the production, Thatcher stated he was 'being as weak as I expected. I hope George Howard will insist on seeing the programme' . 55 Thatcher's faith in Howard was misplaced. Despite being a staunch Tory and Whitelaw's close friend, he was a louche, anti-establishment figure, a 'resolute defender of the BBC' at odds with Thatcher's opinion that the Chairman and his Board were there to keep the BBC in line. 56 What was it that raised Thatcher's ire? Yet again, the secret world's left-wing bete noir had been invoked, this time by Trethowan who was 'acutely conscious' of the need to avoid being exploited by Duncan Campbell. Yet, Trethowan typified the tension between national security and the right to know when he remarked that public interest demanded the BBC address these topical issues. Consequently, the DG had allowed his subordinates to continue to pursue their investigations regarding foreign agencies and intelligence service accountability. Bolton, Mangold, and Penycate were not, however, to attempt to get material from present or former members of the British services, a diktat they largely ignored. This attempted balancing of journalistic integrity with the secret state's needs was doubtless where Thatcher perceived 'weakness' .
Armstrong contended that the government had now gone as far as it could, the only further resort being the veto, an option that could cause an unholy political and public row about censorship. 57 The FCO's Permanent Under Secretary's Department (responsible for the JIC) agreed, noting that 'the fuss about censorship which [using the veto] would almost certainly outweigh any damage to the intelligence services which would arise from allowing a programme … to be screened' . 58 Given that Campbell lurked in the government's psyche like a recurring nightmare, it is worth considering his role in the affair. The Panorama team had met with the journalist, on June 2. As Penycate noted, this was because the BBC were moving into areas of interest that overlapped with Campbell's. Penycate hoped Campbell might be able to steer Panorama towards useful topics or individuals, whilst retaining his rights to source anonymity, compensation, and credit. 59 However, the relationship became sour and acrimonious. There had been two meetings between Campbell, The New Statesman's editor Bruce Page, Penycate, and Mangold, but by 1981 Penycate alleged that the print journalist had made 'threatening and hectoring' telephone calls to him. The producer had reneged on his commitment to give Campbell on-screen credit and a squabble developed over payment. 60 By the February's end, Mangold wrote to Page, complaining about supposedly falsely attributed remarks and anecdotes that appeared in a Campbell article about the Panorama debacle. The BBC man contended that the relationship collapsed because of Campbell's 'splenetic petulance' and noted to his boss Alan Protheroe (Assistant Director of News and Current Affairs) that the Corporation should disengage from any kind of relationship with Campbell. 61 By autumn 1980, attitudes within the Thatcher government hardened, putting Trethowan under even greater pressure. Not only did the DG find himself in off-the-record meetings with senior secret service officers, he also had to deal with Margaret Thatcher's displeasure. The Prime Minister grew increasingly angry about the BBC's alleged prejudice, supposed efforts to discredit the security services, and perceived unwillingness to censor themselves in the national interest.
Official demands on Trethowan were relentless. He found himself privately briefed by MI6's DG Arthur Franks, MI5's chief Sir Howard Smith, and Bernard Sheldon. Trethowan also assured George Howard that the programme would remain within the D Notice system. 62 Armstrong felt that the BBC was displaying 'prejudice against the services' when it was discovered that Panorama was investigating whistleblower John 'Jock' Kane's allegations of fraud and lax security at GCHQ's Hong Kong outpost (allegations that first surfaced in The New Statesman and had then been the subject of the World in Action documentary that had been censored by the IBA). Armstrong commented that just because material had appeared in print, it did not mean the BBC should feel free to air whatever it liked. 'This' , he noted 'was D Notice country' . Regardless, the Cabinet Secretary quashed Trethowan's suggestion that the D Notice Committee's Secretary view a rough cut of the film, believing that leaks and outrage would be the likely consequence. 63 It is clear that where the BBC was concerned, press freedom was not absolute. While print journalists such as Campbell could publish material about the secret state (albeit, with considerable official annoyance), the publicly funded BBC occupied a different space. For officialdom, the corporation's cachet, their global reach, and their central position in post-war Britain's cultural life meant that greater rigour and responsibility was expected of them. The veto resurfaced as the government reassessed its approach. Armstrong was anxious about the programme's potential to 'diminish the morale' of the intelligence services and reduce their 'capacity to do their job effectively' . If threatening a D Notice breach was not enough, the veto might be required. 64 Such was the situation's seriousness that Thatcher called another meeting of senior ministers. 65 Thatcher made it clear that she 'feared that the purpose of those who were making the programme was to discredit' the intelligence services, services that she cherished. Given that the programme was contrary to her perception of the national interest and what the 'British' part of 'BBC' actually meant, the Prime Minister reiterated her willingness to deploy the ultimate deterrent of the veto. Supporting Thatcher, Carrington agreed the veto could potentially be used, but suspected that the BBC would go ahead and leak the programme anyway. Whitelaw -having conversed with his friend George Howardfelt that the veto would be counterproductive. 66 Thatcher viewed a potential informal briefing of the Panorama team by senior intelligence figures with suspicion. While she was happy for Sheldon to brief Mangold, she balked at the involvement of senior worthies such as former MI5 and MI6 DG Dick White. 67 Anthony Acland responded in even stronger terms, contending that any briefing for Mangoldeven by Sheldon -should be avoided. 68 Former Home Secretary Lord Robert Carr's involvement in the programme was also quashed. Carr was unhappy about being asked, but felt he could balance the views of former Labour Home Secretary and Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees, who was known to be appearing in the film (a point that Acland agreed with). 69 However, Thatcher's objections to Carr's participation ended the matter, much to the Conservative peer's relief. 70 After this flurry of discussion, there followed a quiet period, save for a controversial meeting between Trethowan and Mangold. There is little documentary record of this consultation, other than Mangold's recollections and a brief internal memo from the DG. According to Mangold, Trethowan was effusively flattering, but then produced the programme's script and announced that he would be passing it to the people 'at Curzon Street' (then MI5 HQ). Aghast at the potential for the Security Service interfering in a film about their accountability, Mangold told the DG that he would discuss this with Bolton and the team at Lime Grove, as this was the first he had heard of official interest in the production. This led to an outburst from Trethowan, who allegedly described Bolton as a 'Marxist little shit' and forbade Mangold from discussing the meeting with his colleagues. 71 Mangold later noted that he was made to 'stand to attention' in the DG's presence. 72 This exchange escapes mention in Trethowan's follow-up memo to Mangold, commiserating about his inability to 'open one or two doors' . He also attempted to mollify his subordinate, noting that 'I don't normally get involved in such programme details, but when we are dealing with such very sensitive issues, involving an inevitable Whitehall concern, it's obviously helpful' . 73 Trethowan's alleged admission about passing the script to MI5 is all the more remarkable in light of the media focus that would be placed on Panorama in early 1981.
1981 brought new challenges for the government and its bid to reinforce the secret state. The Panorama affair rumbled on and further revelations were on the horizon. Crispin Aubrey -of ABC Trial fame -was due to publish Who's Watching You?, examining the intelligence services and his treatment at their hands. 74 Even more sensationally (although the government did not have an inkling about it until February), Chapman Pincher was preparing his book Their Trade Is Treachery, an alarming, Le Carré-esque, sensationalized account of Soviet moles at the top of Britain's secret services. 75 The Panorama production was therefore emerging into a world of revelations.
On 13 January Trethowan viewed a rough cut of the 100-min film at a screening in Soho. Also present at the screening were Bolton, Mangold, Penycate, and certain individuals unknown to the Panorama team. 76 While, Trethowan claimed, there was a perfectly decent programme on accountability, when it turned to operational matters the team had 'predictably done so in a manner which is naïve and wholly lacking in authority. Some of the witnesses are highly dubious and the programme as it stands would undermine the prestige of "Panorama" and the BBC' . Trethowan suggested cuts to trim the episode down to the usual 50-min Panorama slot. 77 These cuts involved Panorama's displaying the intelligence service's structure, which Trethowan claimed was inaccurate, but refused to say how or why. 78 The DG communicated this to the Managing Director of Television Alasdair Milne, the Director of News and Current Affairs Richard Francis, and then downwards to the team. Francis -having spent several years running BBC operations in Northern Ireland and being the Corporations's man on the D-Notice Committee -was only too aware of official secrecy's strictures. In an effort to retain as much material as possible, he suggested splitting the programme into two episodes: one on the services and one on issues of surveillance and privacy. 79 The critical feature of these events was that the cuts were not Trethowan's. The mysterious figures at the screening included none other than Bernard Sheldon. While a careful veil of secrecy was maintained around this, it was Sheldon -on the secret services' behalf -who outlined the cuts that Trethowan should recommend, with Armstrong commenting to Thatcher on 30 January that Sheldon had done a 'very good job' . Concurrently, the Cabinet Secretary was anxious that Sheldon's role in affairs not filter down to the Panorama team for fear of leaks. 80 Despite Sheldon's 'very good job' of censorship, the situation was exacerbated by leaks to the print media, creating exactly the 'hoo ha' that Armstrong had wanted to avoid. Furthermore, it provided what might have been (but for Thatcher and Armstrong was not) an instructive lesson for the government about the dangers of interfering with public debate on intelligence issues. Unknown individuals within the BBC leaked the story to the Guardian's David Leigh -himself a prominent critic of official secrecysparking a minor witch hunt at Lime Grove. 81 Led by the Guardian, the Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Morning Star, Sunday Times, and The Times all carried stories about government and secret services censorship, 'tendentious' and 'carping' accounts that Trethowan was forced to rebut. 82 In all cases, the DG categorically denied there had been any government interference and that he was merely carrying out an editor-in-chief's duties. 83 Claims of official intrusion influenced calls for an official inquiry into phone tapping. Conservative MP John Gorst switched to the opposition side and supported tapping controls after the Guardian's reporting on alleged Panorama revelations about NSA bugging of Labour party phones. 84 Thus began a period when Trethowan became the scapegoat for the Panorama affair. Indeed, Armstrong was relieved that the spotlight was firmly on the DG. 85 Thatcher's pugnacious press secretary Bernard Ingham took the standard government line that the PM would not comment on intelligence and security issues. 86 Armstrong recommended that, should Thatcher be quizzed in an upcoming TV interview, she should say that 'The BBC were told that, in view of the risks to national security inherent in such a programme, people in Government service would be instructed not to give interviews or cooperate with those making the programme. But the BBC has, under its charter, complete editorial freedom, and it was and is, entirely within the responsibility of the BBC to decide whether to show such a programme' . The Cabinet Secretary emphasised that 'we should not, for instance, wish to be drawn on the channels by which or the levels at which the Government communicated with the BBC on these matters' .
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Government silence contrasted with demands on Trethowan to justify his actions. The DG stated to the Board of Management and the News and Current Affairs Department that after Gau's 'naïve' letters he had let the team continue, feeling that accountability was a matter of public interest. Although admitting that the government had indicated that the programme 'was not a good idea' , his objections and cuts were based on maintaining editorial standards. 88 Supporting the programme -and indicating that there had been talk of a potential prosecution -Glenn del Medico (the Corporation's forceful lawyer) argued that the risks of showing the film were 'absolutely minimal' and that a prosecution under the official secrets act was highly unlikely. 89 Trethowan hoped that no one had read too much into the reports of censorship coming out the Guardian.
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Unfortunately for the Director General, many people were reading a considerable amount into the reports of censorship. The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the Federation of Broadcasting Unions (FBU) expressed their anger and concern at the allegations of government and secret service censorship. 91 A meeting with union officials was hastily convened in order to head off a further confrontation with the unions, which had been plaguing the BBC for some time. Trethowan argued that the furore about censorship was merely a 'storm in a largish teacup' . 92 In a subsequent press release intended to calm the situation, Trethowan again claimed that nobody had challenged the BBC's independence and that accountability, at least, was a matter of legitimate public interest. 93 Threats of potential legal action arrived from the hard-right former deputy director of MI6 George Young, who had taken part in the programme. Young was worried not about censorship, but about 'grave distortions' of his views by the Panorama team. 94 Trethowan agreed that, from what he had seen, some of the production was not very well balanced, but he was personally involved in making sure it took a fair approach. 95 Finally, a group of agitated MPs (all NUJ members) took the DG to task, with their leader Philip Whitehead (a former BBC producer) growing even more frustrated when the response arrived from a mere subordinate. 96 Yet again, Trethowan had to mollify the aggrieved party. 97 Censorship furore notwithstanding, the programme trundled towards transmission. After Francis' suggestion of splitting the production, the film was divided into a programme on the services (for transmission on 23 February) and a programme on privacy and surveillance (for transmission on 2 March).
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According to Francis, the programmes went to great lengths not to reveal critical intelligence sites or the names of serving officers. 99 His deputy Alan Protheroe contended that the films raised 'important principles which should very properly be the subject of a Panorama programme' . 100 Despite this, senior management were still on edge. Gau had to reassure Milne that two programmes in seven days would not be too hard for the public to take. Delaying screening would 'provide a field day for the conspiracy theorists that abound in this area' and that 'cries of censorship would once again echo down the corridors of Fleet Street' . Moreover, the phone tapping issue was highly topical, with Lord Diplock's report on the matter due for release. 101 Trethowan suspected that once the films were screened, those who cried 'censorship!' would wonder what all the fuss had been about. 102 Yet, there were still doubts about the two films. Trethowan asked Protheroe if there was the opportunity to tack a studio discussion onto the privacy programme? When the combative Protheroe said no, Trethowan expressed unhappiness about the way things had turned out, feeling that Lime Grove had 'conned' him. His unhappiness stemmed from a perceived lack of attention to Sheldon's suggested cuts and the privacy production's in-depth nature. 103 Protheroe had good reason to resist Trethowan's entreaties. Three days before, the D Notice Committee had instructed him to make further (albeit relatively minor) cuts to the programmes. Committee Secretary William Ash had reviewed the scripts and felt that certain elements contravened D Notices and, despite the cuts, it was made clear that none of his comments should be construed as giving permission for transmission. 104 The cuts would have been more extensive, but as Armstrong pointed out to Thatcher, much of the material was already in the public domain. 'In short' , he noted 'Sir Ian Trethowan has not managed to clean the programme up to the extent we might have hoped' . 105 Thatcher did not regard the programme's transmission as a happy prospect but -short of deploying the veto -there was nothing more she could do. 106 On February 23 the film on the secret services was transmitted, followed one week later by the privacy segment. The former was broad in scope, covering the KGB's activities in the UK, the role of British mole in the Kremlin Oleg Penkovsky, lurid accusations by Conservative MP Jonathan Aitken about 1950s SIS plans to assassinate Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser, the US-UK intelligence relationship, and the US IOA. 107 Accountability -the original issue behind the entire affair -was relegated to being one theme amongst many. Former Labour Foreign Secretary David Owen suggested on camera that parliamentary oversight of intelligence functions would be advantageous. 108 The privacy programme addressed issues of data protection, surveillance, and phone tapping. The film also highlighted the case of Jan Martin, a wholly innocent industrial film-maker who -because of an improbable series of events involving the Red Army Faction, Dutch police, MI5, Special Branch, and the Taylor Woodrow building company -had almost lost her livelihood. 109 After all the governmental anxiety, talk of censorship, Trethowan's hand-wringing, and imposed cuts, the programmes received little comment. Other stories -Prince Charles and Diana Spencer's engagement on 24 February, an attempted coup in Spain, Thatcher's visit to the United States -dominated the headlines, with only a handful of stories covering the programmes. 110 Within the BBC, the reaction was muted. Gau thought the first programme 'nice' and 'discrete' , while BBC1's controller thought it 'unsurprising' . 111 More widely, some news and current affairs staff wondered what all the fuss had been about. 112 Noting that the programme on privacy was easily the better of the two, Trethowan and Milne were relieved at the quiet passage of programmes that had 'excited much controversy in advance' . 113 Mangold unintentionally agreed with Duncan Campbell when he noted that the brouhaha stemmed from the broadcaster moving into areas previously the print media's province. 114 Within government, the reaction was also muted. Anthony Acland was visited by a furious Lord Robert Hankey, formerly a senior British diplomat. Hankey felt that the first programme was very damaging and 'symptomatic of the campaign to destroy the effectiveness of our intelligence services' . He regarded the government as feeble on these matters and planned to take the matter up with Trethowan. 115 Questions were also raised in the House, although Thatcher was given the usual advice to simply say nothing about the secret services. 116 After all that had happened since Gau's May 27 letters, the anger within government, the demonization of Trethowan, the media and union fury, and the exasperation generated at Lime Grove, the programmes sank with little trace. Three weeks later, Parliament would enter into vigorous debate, not about the accountability of Britain's contemporary secret services, but regarding the accusations of decades-old betrayal that emerged from Chapman Pincher's Their Trade is Treachery.
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Conclusion
Despite the programme's relatively minor media impact and the overblown nature of government concerns, the furore is informative on several levels, and helps us to understand the development of tactics and beliefs that would come to be part of the Thatcher government's approach to the media and secret intelligence issues in a resurgent Cold War. These tactics and beliefs would reach their apotheosis in the Spycatcher affair four years later. The belief that public discussion about -and increased accountability of -secret service activities would automatically damage the morale and effectiveness of clandestine agencies was central to official objections. Again, this was founded in the idea of the Cold War as actual war. The affair illustrates the power of ideas and dogmatic approaches. Thatcher never wavered from her conviction that the BBC was part of a left-wing, anti-British plot to discredit the security and intelligence services and damage Britain's national security. That 'national security' was all the more important during a time when the Cold War resurged and 'The Troubles' were an imminent threat. The BBC's unwillingness to self-censor in the name of the national interest only served to reinforce the belief that the broadcaster was subversive, dangerous, and anti-British.
On the other side, the Panorama team never wavered from their belief in what they were doing. The Thatcher government came up against a press seeking greater openness and accountability in public life. The Profumo affair, Watergate, CIA revelations, open source information, all of these influenced the climate into which the programme appeared. The very thing that Thatcher took issue with -the BBC's reach and cachet, and the corporations mandate to inform -was the very reason why Mangold and his colleagues pursued the matter so doggedly.
In their unwillingness to deploy the nuclear option of the veto, the government realised that their power to influence the media had limits. As the furore over censorship illustrates, openly suppressing inquiry -or attempting to do so -could have more dramatic consequences than the inquiries themselves. Regardless, such was their desire to prevent discussion on secret intelligence issues that they took great risks in their attempts to have the Panorama programmes suppressed. And, although despising Ian Trethowan's 'weakness' , it was actually his strength that prevented the affair from exposing official interference in the editorial affairs of Britain's public broadcaster. Despite this, the tension between impartiality, responsibility, and national security during a period of resurgent Cold War was there for all to see. It also illustrated the problems that arose when the BBC stepped into sensitive areas that had previously been the domain of print journalists. This was one area where Campbell and Mangold could agree: the rules for television were stricter than those for print.
The Panorama affair was an early challenge to the Thatcher government's views on secrecy. It demonstrated to them that suppressing information was possible, but the programmes' muted passing left the most important official lesson unlearned, despite the realization that the veto was untenable. This lesson was that overzealous attempts at censorship were potentially far more damaging and dangerous that almost any information that was made public. Spycatcher brought together the same volatile mixture of officialdom, the secret services, and the media. Yet when Peter Wright's memoir became an issue for Thatcher and Armstrong, there was no Ian Trethowan to act as a firewall between the government and a voracious press. MI5 came into official existence in 1989, followed in 1994 by MI6 and GCHQ. There is a good argument that in order to function effectively, secret services must have an appropriate level of secrecy. An equally valid argument demands that in democratic societies, clandestine agencies must be subject to appropriate oversight by Parliament, a free press and the public. The debate continues today over Edward Snowden's status, communications surveillance, and the workings of intelligence services. It is a debate that we must have, and one that should be informed by an understanding of the ways in which the state, the intelligence services, and media have collided in our distant and recent past.
Notes
